[How do international institutions with historically racist practices evolve to adopt more equal practices? This paper introduces the theory of "anti-racist capture," arguing that this evolution is driven by two conjoined variables: increasing external social pressure, through naming and shaming and the collective threat of institutional exit, and the presence of ideologically motivated and critically influential bureaucratic entrepreneurs within the institution. The paper uses the International Criminal Court (ICC) as its primary case, analyzing its initial two-decade focus on Africa and its subsequent shift toward investigating and indicting individuals outside the continent, despite repercussions from powerful Western states. This transformation is attributed to a legitimacy crisis triggered by allegations of racism and collective threats of withdrawal from African states, coupled with the agency of bureaucratic elites in the Office of the Prosecutor. To test the theory's necessity claims, the paper process-traces two negative cases: the League of Nations Mandates System and UN Peacekeeping Operations, both of which experienced sustained naming-and-shaming on racial grounds without transformation, and shows that in each case the absence of a viable collective exit threat and/or an influential internal entrepreneur accounts for lack of progress. The paper also directly engages power politics as a rival explanation and shows where they are consistent with, and where they are outperformed by, the anti-racist capture account. The paper contributes to theories of institutional transformation, which have not explained why IO discriminatory practices vary within and across institutions, and to studies of race in international relations, which have identified a global racial hierarchy but not the conditions under which progress against it is achieved. ]

[What is the influence of digital investigative technologies on transnational advocacy organizations' (TAOs) network power? This paper argues that the ability to create a "digital witness" using tools such as GIS, satellite imagery, open-source intelligence, and 3D spatial reconstruction reduces constraints on TAOs by broadening two forms of network power: access and brokerage. TAOs using digital investigations gain greater access power by becoming less constrained by the lack of vested enforcement authority, and greater brokerage power by connecting otherwise inaccessible rights violators — such as Russia and Sudan's Rapid Support Forces — to international courts and law. The paper also demonstrates how TAOs have become first movers in creating international soft law on digital investigations, as evidenced by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open-Source Investigations. Findings draw on semi-structured interviews with human rights advocates and lawyers and case studies of the wars in Ukraine and Sudan.]

[This paper examines how third-country deportations (the practice of deporting migrants to countries where they lack citizenship or legal ties) offshore legal violence and racialize migration diplomacy. IR scholarship on migration diplomacy is overwhelmingly built on great power politics, distinguishing between cooperative and coercive modes of migration policy. We complicate this literature by asking whether the racial identity of the receiving state itself functions as a form of currency: does a state's position in the global racial hierarchy affect what it can extract in a deal, or how much scrutiny the arrangement draws? We argue that third-country deportation agreements are a contemporary expression of colonial racial hierarchy, in which receiving states occupy the position of the "semi-civilized"/not fully sovereign equals, but useful intermediaries for powerful states. The paper draws on an original dataset of global third-country deportation dyads, disaggregated by agreement type]